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NECESSARY* ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1952
HARRY N. ROSENFIELD*
T is probably accurate to say of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
19521 that few laws enacted by the Congress are longer and more
complex,2 or have been subject to greater and more widespread criticism
by successive Presidents of the United States,3 by both national political
parties4 and by individual citizens and representative American organiza-
tions.5 This article, however, will not deal with the law's basic and highly
controversial substantive policies, such as the national origins system,
quotas, or the criteria for selecting prospective immigrants. Instead, it
will be limited to seven specific administrative and procedural areas in
which the organized legal profession has reached a general consensus as
to the nature of the substantial reforms that are necessary and desirable.
For convenience, these seven proposals are grouped into three major
categories: Organizational Structure; Administrative Hearings; and Judi-
cial Review.
I. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAW
The issue here considered is the organizational structure established
by statute for the allocation of governmental functions in the field of
* Member of the District of Columbia and New York Bars.
I. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952) (here-
inafter cited as Act of 1952).
2. The act is subdivided into 143 sections, a great number of which are further sub-
divided into subsections, paragraphs, subparagraphs, and clauses. For example, the very
first section, § 101, which deals with "Definitions," occupies 6 and 2/3 pages of the official
law print. Section 101 consists of seven subsections, one of which includes a proviso. Six of
the seven subsections are divided into a total of 60 paragraphs, of which three have provisos,
and three an indefinite extension of the "definition." Six of the 60 paragraphs are further
divided into a total of 26 paragraphs, of which two include exceptions and three include
provisos. Five of the 26 subparagraphs are further subdivided into a total of 15 clauses,
of which two include exceptions. Some of the definitions relate to the entire act, some
apply only to Titles I and II, and others still apply only to Title III.
Section 101 also includes 21 cross-references to other specified parts of the act, one to all
other parts of the act, three to other acts and one to all other acts.
3. President Truman vetoed the bill. H.R. Doc. No. 520, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
President Eisenhower attacked the act during his first presidential campaign (see Rosenfield,
The Prospects for Immigration Amendments, 21 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 404-05 (1956)),
and sent special messages to Congress recommending substantial amendments. H.R. Doc.
No. 329, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); H.R. Doc. No. 85, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957).
4. See Rosenfield, supra note 3, at 403-04.
5. Cf. Heckman, Our Immigration Laws, A Continuing Affront to the Administrative
Procedure Act, 41 Geo. L.J. 364 (1953); President's Commission on Immigration and
Naturalization, Whom We Shall Welcome c. 1 (1953) (hereinafter cited as Pres. Com. Rep.).
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immigration, not the manner in which the immigration law is being
administered by the Departments of State and Justice. The basic evil
is not the administration of the law, but rather the administrative struc-
ture frozen into law.
Reform Number One-Consolidation of Conflicting and Overlapping
Responsibilities
A. Present Situation
1. Since 1917, there has been a complete dichotomy between the issu-
ance of visas to aliens (a function within the Department of State6), and
the admission of visaed aliens to the United States (a function performed
now by the Attorney General' and prior to June 1940, by the Secretary
of Labor').
2. A visa issued by an American consul is no assurance that the alien
to whom it was issued will be admitted into the United States by the
Attorney General,9 acting through the Immigration and Naturalization
Service.
3. The consul and the immigration officer apply the same law to the
same individual.'" Thus, the result of the present situation is that even
where a single issue of law or fact is involved:
(a) a consul is free to ignore a legal ruling or precedent established by
the Immigration Service or the Board of Immigration Appeals (although
it acts for the Attorney General of the United States"), notwithstanding
the case in question is on all fours with the instant one. If a consul
denies a visa to an alien, even where such action flies in the face of a
contrary ruling by the other departmental authorities or even by the
courts, such alien and his American sponsor are without any right of
appeal to anyone; 12
(b) immigration authorities within the Department of Justice, either
in original jurisdiction or on appeal to a specal inquiry officer or to the
6. See Act of 1952 §§ 221-24.
7. Id. §§ 231-40. The Attorney General has delegated this power to the Commissioner
of Immigration and Naturalization. 8 C.F.R. § 9.1 (1958).
8. Reorg. P1. No. V of 1940, 54 Stat. 1238 (1940). See 5 U.S.C. § 133t (1952). For
earlier history of Immigration & Naturalization Service, see Gordon, Judicial Review of
Exclusion & Deportation, 31 Interpreter Releases 74, 75 (Mar. 1, 1954); The Immigration
and Naturalization Systems of the United States, S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
290-91 (1950) (hereinafter cited as Sen. Jud. Rep.).
9. Act of 1952 § 221(h).
10. Pres. Com. Rep. at 127. See Besterman, Commentary on the Immigration &
Nationality Act ("the long established principle of double check"). Cf. Act of 1952 § 221(h).
11. 8 C.F.R. Pt. 6 (1958). See Part II A(2) infra. Query, effect of Act of 1952 § 103
("determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law
shall be controlling.") ?
12. See Part II A(1) infra.
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Board of Immigration Appeals may completely ignore, or reject, the
findings of fact or legal rulings of a consul even when such ruling is
bolstered by an Advisory Opinion from the Visa Office of the Department
of State.
B. Recommendations of Presidential or Congressional Commissions
Three Presidential or Congressional Commissions have found this
duplication in statutory structure and allocation of governmental func-
tions to be undesirable, and have recommended a consolidation in a
single government agency of all authority to issue visas to aliens overseas
and to inspect them for admission at ports of entry in the United States.
1. The First Hoover Commission
The Commission on Organization of the -Executive Branch of the
Government, established by act of Congress, concluded in its 1949 report
that this dual control of immigration was unwise, and recommended that
the functions of the Visa Division of the Department of State be trans-
ferred to the Department of Justice.
The first Hoover Commission made two pertinent recommendations:
1. The State Department as a general rule should not be given responsibility for
the operation of specific programs whether overseas or at home.
2. [T]he functions of visa control . . . should be transferred from the State
Department to the Justice Department.1 3
The Hoover Commission's Task Force on Foreign Affairs, whose
recommendation was subsequently adopted by the Commission, made this
analysis of the situation:
Thus, the situation in connection with the issuance of visas is confusing because of
the division of authority between the Departments of State and Justice. Specifically,
both have joint policy, regulatory and procedural responsibilities in the issue of visas,
and whereas the State Department grants the initial visa to an alien the Justice Depart-
ment has the final authority to approve or disapprove the visa on the basis of its inde-
pendent judgment.1 4
The Task Force submitted the following recommendations:
1. All visa responsibility, therefore, except with respect to diplomatic visas should
be placed in the Justice Department. Visa work presently performed by the Foreign
Service abroad should be continued but in accordance with policies established by the
Justice Department in consultation with the State Department.
2. The logical solution to the visa problem lies in the transfer of the Visa Division
functions to the Department of Justice. Diplomatic visas, however, should remain
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State.' 5
13. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, Report on
Foreign Affairs, H.R. Doc. No. 79, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 32, 34 (1949).
14. Task Force Report on Foreign Affairs, 104 (App. H 1949).
15. Id. at 18.
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2. The Perlman Commission
The President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, which
was established by Executive Order, recommended in its 1953 report
that there be a consolidation of all immigration and naturalization func-
tions into a single agency, and proposed the creation of a new commission
for such purpose. Its report said:
The Commission agrees with the Hoover Commission that a large program of such
an administrative operation as the immigration law has no place in the Department of
State .... The Commission recommends that the primary determination overseas of
an alien's application for a visa to the United States should be made by officials of the
same agency which determines admissibility at the ports of entry. Presentation of such
visa at a port of entry in the United States should entitle an alien to be admitted without
further inquiry except as to (1) identity, (2) any medical condition developed since the
visa was issued, and (3) any evidence relating to subversive activities not previously
considered. 16
The Commission concluded:
There is no reason why there should be two independent determinations of the same
issue, except upon the basis of mistrust and fear. Every national purpose would be fully
served by one thorough and trustworthy determination.
The best available information indicates that this costly, unwieldy, and unbusiness-
like duplication serves no reasonable purpose. It is hardly more than historical acci-
dent which has become, to some, a principle....
* * * The time has come to terminate the unnecessary and costly obstructions estab-
lished by the duplication of visa and immigration examination. This could be accom-
plished by eliminating overlapping and duplication through unifying these functions in
a single process. The result will be a more effective administration of the law, a saving
of Government expenditures, and a better location of administrative responsibility. 17
3. The Wright Commission
The Commission on Government Security was established by act of
Congress and included, among its members, Mr. Loyd Wright, former
president of the American Bar Association, Congressman Francis E.
Walter, co-author of the 1952 act, one other member of the House of
Representatives, and two United States Senators. In its 1957 report,
this Commission recommended that:
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 should be amended to (1) transfer
the functions of visa control, except for diplomatic and official visas, from the Depart-
ment of State to the Department of Justice and (2) authorize the Attorney General to
maintain offices and personnel abroad to carry out the visa functions without the con-
currence of the Secretary of State being a requisite for such action.' s
The Wright Commission, after consideration of the various points of
view, concluded:
16. Pres. Com. Rep. at 135.
17. Id. at 134-35.
18. Report of the Commission on Government Security 572 (July 1957) (hereinafter
cited as Wright Report).
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The Commission on Government Security has deliberated at length over the implica-
tions of the Hoover Commission recommendation. On the basis of our own analysis of
all facets of this complex question, we arrive at the same conclusion.
To insure maximum security in this area, responsibility properly must be concen-
trated in the agency the Congress has always intended shall make final determination of
admissibility or inadmissibility. To achieve that goal, there must be a realignment to
insure complete control by the Immigration Service from the time the alien first makes
application for a visa right down to the moment he first sets foot on the American
shoreline. 19
C. Views Supporting Status Quo
The status quo of dual administration has been supported by the
Senate Judiciary Committee2 ° and the Department of State." But what
was once a solid phalanx of support for the status quo has been split in
two. The McCarran-Walter Act's acceptance of dual administration
seems to have been abandoned by its co-author Walter who signed the
Wright Commission's report condemning this organizational pattern. And
the Commissioner of Immigration now favors consolidation of these
functions.2"
D. Previous Administrative Efforts
The proposals for consolidation have been made in the historical con-
text of continuous administrative efforts to cope with the unsatisfactory
situation growing out of over-lapping responsibilities and conflicting deci-
sions. Even before the Immigration Act of 1924, Immigration Service
officers were assigned as attach6s to consulates overseas.3 Up to World
War II, these immigration officers acted only as technical advisers to the
consuls.24  But since 1948, under the displaced persons25 and refugee
relief 20 programs, immigration officers stationed overseas have determined
admissibility of aliens, after documentation with a visa, before their
19. Id. at 577-78. The Commission's proposals are incorporated in S. 2416, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1957).
20. Cf. Sen. Jud. Rep. at 331, 333.
21. The views of the State Department are outlined in the Wright Report, supra note
18, at 574-77; and, in a special report to the Perlman Commission, Hearings before the
President's Commission on Immigration & Naturalization, House Committee on the judiciary,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1881 (1952) (hereinafter cited as Pres. Com. Hearings). See also Pres.
Com. Rep. at 133.
22. Wright Report, supra note 18, at 574.
23. See Peters, U.S. Immigration Experts As Consular Officers, III Foreign Born 78
(1922).
24. Pres. Com. Rep. at 132.
25. Displaced Persons Commission, The DP Story 313 (1952).
26. Administrator of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, First Semiannual Report, House
judiciary Committee Print, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1954); Hearings before Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Investigation on Administration of Refugee
Relief Act, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 290 (1955).
1958]
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embarkation, just as if the inspections were being conducted at ports of
entry into the United States. However, this practice was known to each
of the Presidential or Congressional Commissions and apparently per-
suaded none of them as being suitable or able to achieve any effective
solution to the problems arising from dual responsibilities and administra-
tion under the immigration and nationality laws.
E. The American Bar Association
The American Bar Association has also proposed abolition of the
present system of dual and over-lapping administration of our immigra-
tion laws. The Board of Governors adopted the following resolution:
RESOLVED, that it is the opinion of the American Bar Association that the im-
migration and nationality laws of the United States should be amended to consolidate
into the Department of Justice or an independent agency of government the immigra-
tion and national responsibilities now vested by law in the Department of State and
the Attorney General, and
That the Section of Administrative Law be authorized and directed to advance ap-
propriate legislation.2 7
The Committee on Immigration and Nationality of the American
Bar Association, Section of Administrative Law, proposed the above
resolution after reaching the following conclusions:
A study of the present dual administration of our law has led the American Bar
Association to the following conclusions:
1. that no sound reason exists for such duplication of responsibility by two inde-
pendent agencies of government;
2. that such duplication is wasteful, unnecessary and unjustifiable, and
3. that it is in our national interest to consolidate into a single government agency
the immigration and naturalization responsibilities vested in the Department of State
and in the Attorney General. 28
What agency should administer these consolidated functions? The
Hoover and Wright Commissions proposed that it be the Department of
Justice; the Perlman Commission, an independent commission, and the
American Bar Association eschewed any formal choice. Although the
logic of the proposal for an independent commission appears to be
superior, the particular agency is not as important as the consolidation
itself. The merger of responsibilities now split between two government
agencies in the field of immigration and nationality should not be blocked
27. The above resolution was adopted by the Board of Governors in May 1958.
28. Resolution and Report, approved by Committee on Immigration and Nationality
on December 13, 1957, in a form slightly different from that adopted by the Board.
Consolidation in the Department of Justice is proposed by 5 pending bills: H.R. 3364,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 103, 105(b) (3), 113, 506(b) (1957); H.R. 8339, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2 (1957) ; H.R. 9352, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 402 (1957) ; H.R. 9937, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 402 (1958); S. 2416, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1958).
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by quarrel over the identity of the new repository of responsibility and
authority.
II. ADMZISTRATI HEARINGS
A. Right to a Hearing
"The right to be heard," wrote Justice Frankfurter, "is a principle basic
to our society."' It is at the very heart of the administrative process.
"The core of our constitutional system," said Chief Justice Warren, "is
that individual liberty must never be taken away by shortcuts, that fair
trials in independent courts must never be dispensed with."3" Administra-
tive agencies, said Chief Justice Hughes, "must accredit themselves by
acting in accordance with the cherished judicial tradition embodying the
basic concepts of fair play."31
Reform Number Two-Right of Appeal From a Denial of a Visa
Only a consul may issue a visa to an alien for admission into the United
States. 2 If he issues the visa, there is an automatic and mandatory review
in each instance. This review of consular grants of visas, by the Attorney
General through the Immigration Service,3 3 is completely de novo34 and
may entail a complete re-evaluation of the evidence presented to the
consul even where that evidence tended to support his action and where
there was no fraud or misrepresentation and where the issue is merely
a matter of difference of judgment. 5
However, where the consul denies, or refuses to issue, a visa, he is a law
unto himself, and his action is final and cannot be reviewed by any other
administrative authority. 6 It is current legal doctrine that this adminis-
trative absolutism prevails even where the consul has acted unreason-
ably37 or has committed palpable error.38
29. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
30. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 370-71 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
31. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 22 (1938).
32. Act of 1952 § 104(a).
33. Id. §§ 231-40.
34. Id. § 221(h); see Developments in the Law-Immigration and Nationality, 66 Harv.
L. Rev. 643, 661-62 (1953).
35. In the Matter of M-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 532 (1952) (decision by the Attorney General
of the United States).
36. For a discussion of this general subject, see Rosenfield, Consular Non-Reviewability:
A Case Study in Administrative Absolutism, 41 A.B.J. 1109 (1955).
37. United States ex rel. London v. Phelps, 22 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276
U.S. 630 (1928). See also United States ex rel. Gruber v. Karnuth, 29 F.2d 314 (D.C.N.Y.
1928), aff'd, 30 F.2d 242 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 850 (1929).
38. See United States ex rel. Dalleo v. Corsi, 55 F.2d "Y4l (D.C.N.Y. 1932) (mistake of
law in State Department's instructions to consul); United States ex rel. Swystun v.
1958]
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Not even the Secretary of State may exercise supervision over his sub-
ordinate, the consul, in this regard. The law specifically forbids the Secre-
tary of State to exercise any administrative control over "any power,
duties and functions conferred upon the consular officers relating to the
granting or refusal of visas. ' 39 (For whatever significance it may have
in statutory construction, there is no specific statutory immunity for
consuls against judicial review.) 40 According to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, which drafted the 1952 act, there is no appeal from a con-
sular visa denial, under the prior law, and "even if the Visa Division
[of the State Department] disagrees with the decision of the consul it
cannot order him to change his decision but may merely make sugges-
tions such as where a misinterpretation of the law occurs.'
The Visa Office has sought valiantly to set up an informal, non-
appellate and purely advisory "review." This is valuable as far as it goes,
but there is no recognized right of review, no specified procedures, no
formal review panels, no regulations-and worst of all, no directive effect
on the consul whose decision is being "reviewed. ' 2
It is difficult to find any other situation in our whole legal system in
which so crucial a power is lodged in the initial operating officer and
then insulated from any possibility of review. Such a pattern of govern-
mental action is not consistent with the general principles upon which
power is exercised in our system of law. It encourages the arbitrary and
irresponsible exercise of power. Justice Douglas once said that "absolute
discretion, like corruption, marks the beginning of the end of liberty.' 43
Justice Frankfurter expressed a basic concept of American law as follows:
Man being what he is cannot safely be trusted with complete immunity from out-
ward responsibility in depriving others of their rights. At least such is the conviction
underlying our Bill of Rights. 44
The Chief Justice put the issue thus:
Under our system of government there should be no way to subject the life and
McCandless, 24 F.2d 211 (D.C. Pa. 1928), aff'd, 33 F.2d 882 (1929) (clerical error); Ex
parte Seid Soo Hong, 23 F.2d 847 (S.D. Cal. 1928) (mistaken form; alien admitted);
Keating ex rel. Mello v. Tillinghast, 24 F.2d 105 (D.C. Mass. 1928) (mistake of law).
39. Act of 1952 § 104(a).
40. See Note, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 502, 505 (1939).
41. Sen. Jud. Rep. at 612-13. See also United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d
984, 986 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 868 (1929).
42. See Pres. Com. Rep. at 149-50; Pres. Com. Hearings at 1889; Sen. Jud. Rep. at
612-13.
43. New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951) (dissenting opinion).




freedom of one individual to the 'unfettered' or, more accurately, the 'arbitrary,' power
of another.45
This "unfettered" freedom of a consul from review of his negative
decisions is unprecedented in our law.4 6 The Minority Report in the
Senate Judiciary Committee signed by four Senators in 1952, when the
present act was passed, said:
Every American citizen has such a right of appeal and review if he wants to bring
a horse or a necklace into the United States. Should he not have the same right of
appeal from unjust decision if he wishes to bring to our shores a child or an aged
parent?
47
Such administrative irresponsibility is an affront to basic principles of
Anglo-American jurisprudence. A British report to the Lord High Chan-
cellor, which was presented to Parliament, states the fundamental issue
succinctly:
The existence of a right of appeal is salutory and makes for right adjudication.48
The self-corrective process of review by an independent authority serves
as insurance against injustice or mistake4 9 and is a safeguard against
abuse of power. 50
Actual experience in reviewing over 22,000 visas through a Board of
Review proves beyond dispute the feasibility of such review.5 1 Such
practicability is further recognized by the State Department in its regula-
tions which require advance review for all visa applications by defectors
from communism.52
It is all the more remarkable for our immigration law to perpetuate
"unbridled power,"5 3 when one considers the substantive questions on
which consular visa denials are absolute and unreviewable. These include
complicated, and not infrequently unresolved, legal problems of eligibility
under our immigration law, as well as difficult determinations of foreign
45. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 366 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
46. Professor Louis L. Jaffe, testifying as Chairman of the American Bar Association
Committee on Immigration & Nationality, Section of Administrative Law, Pres. Com.
Hearings at 1566, 1569.
47. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Revision of Immigration and Nationality Laws,
S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 8-9 (1952) (minority views on S. 2550).
48. Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (London, 1957),
ff 104, p. 25.
49. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (dissenting
opinion).
50. Pres. Com. Hearings af 1578.
51. Pres. Com. Report at 148-49; Pres. Com. Hearings at 1889.
52. Cf. 22 C.F.R. § 42.42 (a) (28) (iii) (1958).
53. Chief Justice Stone, N.J.. B. Ass'n Y.B. 49,. 62 (1922).
1958]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
law and a host of technical issues.54 Yet, when last surveyed only three
per cent of our visa-issuing officers had law degrees and only one per cent
of them were practicing lawyers prior to their appointment to the
Foreign Service.5 5 This is not to urge that all government administra-
tion should be put in the hands of lawyers. However, these facts would
seem to indicate the imprudence in giving consuls final and unreviewable
authority over such matters.
To remedy this situation, the President's Commission on Immigration
and Naturalization recommended in 1953 that aliens should have a right
of administrative review from denials of visas.56 And in 1955 the Ameri-
can Bar Association took the same basic position when it adopted the
following resolution favoring a Board of Visa Appeals:
BE IT RESOLVED, that it is the opinion of the American Bar Association that there
be established a Board of Visa Appeals with power to review the denial by a consul of
a visa and that the Section on Administrative Law be authorized and directed to ad-
vance appropriate legislation to that end.57
The conclusions of the President's Commission and the American Bar
Association seem unassailable. There is no sound reason for consular
absolutism." It is not consonant with our tradition and legal history to
subject individuals to the possibilities of executive caprice, prejudice, or
mistake, without review. The public's chief protection against bureau-
cratic invasion of their rights is in review of governmental action. Means
should be established by law to assure that in connection with the denials
of visas to aliens the prevailing doctrine should be the supremacy of law,
which Chief Justice Stone once defined as meaning: "That the agencies
of government are no more free than the private individual to act accord-
ing to their arbitrary will or whim.", 9
Reform Number Three-Statutory Status for Board of
Immigration Appeals
An alien excluded at a port of entry is, by statute, entitled to a hearing
before a special inquiry officer, and to appeal his decision to the Attorney
54. See Pres. Com. Hearings at 1874-81.
55. Id. at 1864-65.
56. Pres. Com. Rep. at 152, 170-71. Substantial and widespread support for such a
position had been expressed at the commission's hearings. See Pres. Com. Hearings at 2071.
At an earlier time, both Senate and House Committees on Immigration approved bills for
administrative review of visa denials in relative preference cases. S. Rep. No. 504, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1932) ; H.R. Rep. No. 1193, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
57. See 7 Ad. L. Bull. 236 (1955); 8 Ad. L. Bull. 7-8 (1955).
58. For an analysis of reasons advanced to justify the status quo, see Rosenfield, supra
note 36, at 1181-83. H.R. 3364, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107(d)(1) (1957) establishes a
Board of Immigration Appeals with authority to review "all determinations denying, with-
drawing or revoking a visa, or any extension thereof ...."
59. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 17 (1936).
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General.6 0 In deportation, the act provides that special inquiry officers
shall conduct proceedings to determine deportability and that "in any
case in which an alien is ordered deported . . . the decision of the
Attorney General shall be final."'" Although the statute does not specific-
ally require it, appeal to the Attorney General in deportation matters is
provided by regulation.2
The Attorney General has delegated his authority and duty to hear
appeals to a Board of Immigration Appeals established by regulation.6
(Predecessor bodies date back to 1921).6 The BIA, as it is commonly
known, is an important tribunal whose rulings crucially affect thousands
of people. Yet the Board is only a creature of the Attorney General.
Established by regulation, it is subject to abolition at any moment, and
its jurisdiction and authority'5 subject to unrestricted alteration and
change.60
The BIA is not even mentioned in the 119 page Act of 1952, although
a proposal to give it statutory status was adopted on the floor of the
House, only to have the provision eliminated in conference.17 The House
Judiciary Committee's report, while failing to provide statutory status
60. Act of 1952 § 236(b),(c).
61. Id. § 242(b).
62. 8 C.F.R. § 6.1(b)(2) (195$).
63. Id. Pt. 6. The Board of Immigration Appeals (hereinafter cited as BIA) was
established pursuant to power of delegation vested in the Attorney General by the Alien
Registration Act of July 28, 1940, c. 439 § 37(a), 54 Stat. 675. See Atty Gen. Ann. Rep.
234 (1941).
64. In 1921, the Secretary of Labor set up a Board of Review, with administrative and
judicial functions but no power of final decision. Its membership varied over the years
from 3 to 12 persons. In 1933, the Board of Review was placed under the jurisdiction of the
Commissioner of Immigration, but in 1939 was placed back under the Secretary. On August
30, 1940, after the Immigration and Naturalization Service was transferred to the Depart-
ment of Justice (see note 8 supra), the Board of Review was reconstituted as the BIA with
power to decide and not merely recommend. See 66 Cong. Rec. 2532 (1925) (comments by
Congressman Cable); Pres. Com. Rep. at 129; Sen. Jud. Rep. at 317.
65. When created, the BIA had authority to render final decisions in: (1) all deportation
proceedings after warrant of arrest, (2) all appeals from Boards of Special Inquiry, (3) all
cases involving advance application for admission under the 7th and 9th provisos of § 3 of
the Immigration Act of 1917, and (4) all cases involving administrative penalties. Att'y
Gen. Ann. Rep. 234 (1941); 8 C.F.R. 903 (1958). Later its jurisdiction was limited to the
,exercise of appellate authority only. Until May 24, 1952, this appeal was not direct from
the Field Office, but first to the Commissioner, and then to BIA. On July 20, 1954, BIA's
authority was expanded to cover appeal from a District Director's refusal to release alien
on bail or parole. 8 C.F.R. § 6.1(b) (7) (1958).
66. But see United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shatjghnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954)
(unqualified deregation by Attorney General is binding on him).
67. 98 Cong. Rec. 4401 (1952) ; Minority Report on S. 2550, supra note 47, at 8.
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to the BIA, directed the Attorney General not to "alter in any way the
structure and function of the Board." 68
Current regulations set up a five member Board of Immigration Appeals
"in the office of the Attorney General," which "shall be under the super-
vision and direction of the Attorney General and shall be responsible
solely to him."' They outline the Board's jurisdiction, by stating the
kinds of decisions of special inquiry officers, and other Immigration
Service officials, which may be appealed to the Board,7 and provide that
the Board's decisions shall be final,7 and shall be binding upon the
Immigration and Naturalization Service7" unless reviewed by the Attorney
General. Such review occurs only at the direction of the Attorney Gen-
eral, request of the Service, or request of the Chairman or a majority of
the Board.73 The regulations make no provision for the alien himself to
appeal to the Attorney General.74 In fact, the alien is not advised when
the Board has been deprived of authority to decide, by virtue of the fact
that the Attorney General is reviewing his case. Whether this practice
is constitutional is still open to question. A district court held that notice
must be given the alien of referral to the Attorney General and an oppor-
tunity afforded the alien to submit briefs (but not make oral argument).5
However, the court of appeals in the same circuit, in a later case denied
such right to an alien, basing its decision on the specific facts and leaving
open the possibility of a different result on different facts. 6
This situation is indefensible in principle; it is also ultimately destruc-
tive of true BIA independence. In the normal appeal from an adminis-
trative adjudication, the litigants bear their respective burdens of
68. H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1952). See also The Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals, 30 Interpreter Releases 266 (Sept. 9, 1953).
69. 8 C.F.R. § 6.1(a) (1958). The report of Lemuel B. Schofield, Special Assistant to
the Attorney General in Charge of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, on the second
year of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's operation in the Department of Justice,
reported on the BIA's activities as if it were a unit of the Service. (Photostat of typed
report, in Library of Congress, pp. 21-22).
70. 8 C.F.R. § 6.1(b) (1958).
71. Id. § 6.1(d)(2).
72. Id. § 6.1(g). Selected decisions are given precedent status.
73. Id. § 6.1(h). See p. 158 and note 89 infra.
74. Matter of E-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 388, 391 (1954). See Maslow, Recasting Our
Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 309, 318 (1956). In Matter
of R-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 29 (1952), on request, alien's counsel had an informal conference
with the Attorney General and presented arguments. This was followed by a full hearing
before the Attorney General with oral argument by counsel for alien and the Service. See
also Matter of C-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 130 (1950).
75. Bannout v. Brownell, 129 F. Supp. 488 (D.D.C. 1955). The Government filed no
appeal. Anything less, said the court, might raise a constitutional issue under Morgan
v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
76. Nani v. Brownell, 247 F.2d 103 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 870 (1957).
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persuasion. Here, however, either the BIA's decision is not defended
before the Attorney General, or the BIA must be placed in the position,
almost, of a litigant arguing to sustain its position. Furthermore, what
assurance can the alien have that new legal arguments, or non-record
information, were not presented to the Attorney General, without any
opportunity to the alien himself to contest the newly presented law or
facts? For example, in one of the early cases, the Official Report prints
the Board's decision, then a "Memorandum for the Acting Attorney
General" apparently by a staff attorney of the Department of Justice, in
the form of a reasoned opinion with an order prepared for reversal of the
BIA, and then a reversal of the Board by the Acting Attorney General
without opinion.77 In another instance, there was a memorandum from the
office of the Solicitor General, and a reversal by the Attorney General
stating reliance upon such memorandum. 78 Often the Attorney General's
action is a peremptory "disapproved"7  or "approved,"80 without any
clue to the alien as to the "why's" and "wherefores." And sometimes the
Attorney General will first approve or disapprove the Board's decision and
then withdraw his action or reverse himself, in both instances without any
reason assigned.8
Furthermore, the interval between the Board's decision and the At-
torney General's action has on occasion been as long as nineteen
months.82 During all this period the alien is presumably kept in the
dark; government agencies are fighting over his body, so to speak, with-
out giving him any opportunity to act in his own defense. Whatever one's
judgments of this practice in terms of "the rudimentary requirements of
fair play ' 83 and "the historic requirements of fairness,"'  there can be
77. Matter of E-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 44 (1941).
78. Matter of S-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 476 (1943).
79. 'See Matter of 0-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 209 (1950).
So. Matter of The S. S. Atlantida, 2 I. & N. Dec. 570 (1944).
81. The Matter of A-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 714 (1949) (first approval and then disapproval);
Matter of B-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 492 (1947) (disapproval first and then approval). In Matter
of C-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 895 (1947), the initial disapproval had an opinion, but was with-
drawn and reversed without opinion.
82. Matter of V-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 1 (1955). A delay exceeding 17 months occurred in
Matter of B- and P-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 638 (1947). For delays exceeding 14 months, see
Matter of C-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 275 (1950); Matter of 0-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 209 (1950). See
also Matter of C-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 20 (1955). Note, however, that the BIA has reported
to Congress that "the average time" of a case before it is one month. Report of the House
Committee on Government Operations, Survey and Study of Administrative Organization,
Procedure and Practice in the Federal Agencies, 8S5th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 6, 696 (1957)
(hereinafter cited as Govt. Oper. Survey).
83. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 15 (1938).
84. joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
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little doubt as to its disquieting effect on the alien's and the general
public's belief as to the BIA's independence.
Another disturbing result of the Board's organizational status is that
its decisions are released to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
in advance of notification to the alien involved. 85 This practice is justified
on the ground that it affords the Service "an opportunity to decide
whether or not some such action should be taken, such as a motion."8 "
It is extraordinary, to say the least, in adjudicatory matters, to give one
litigant a secret opportunity "to decide whether or not some such action
should be taken" in the absence of a similar opportunity to the other
litigant."7
To date, six volumes of BIA decisions and opinions have been pub-
lished."8 These volumes disclose that, for one or another reason, the
Attorney General has formally reviewed some 148 BIA decisions"gin
at least 41 instances at the request of the Immigration Service-and has
reversed the Board some 43 times. These volumes, however, do not record
all of BIA's decisions. According to the Annual Reports of the Attorney
General from 1942 through 1956, the Attorney General reviewed 444
BIA decisions of one kind or another during this fifteen year period, and
reversed, modified or remanded in 69 instances. The number of reviews
in the four-year period of 1953-1956 has dropped to an average of 8 cases
per year from an average of 37 cases per year in the previous eleven year
period. However, the number of reversals, modifications or remands has
increased from 14Y per cent in the 1942-1952 period to 28 per cent in
the 1953-1956 period.
A quasi-judicial agency dealing with issues of personal status and
rights should meet the test which Chief Justice Hughes once described
as "the maintenance of public confidence in the fairness and soundness
of this important governmental process."90 Where an adjudicating agency
85. 8 C.F.R. § 6.1(f) (1958) requires that the Board's decision "shall be transmitted
by the Board to the Service and a copy served upon the alien or party affected. .. ."
86. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Legal and Monetary Affairs of the House
Committee on Government Operations, Practices and Procedures of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service in Deportation Proceedings, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 135, 189 (1955).
87. Query, whether the system of unannounced certifications to the Attorney General
requires this practice?
88. The volumes cited as "I. & N. Decisions" are published not by BIA, but by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and include decisions of the Service as well as
BIA's. See Foreword, 1 I. & N. Dec. IV (1940). The six volumes cover the period from
Aug. 1940 to Jan. 1956.
89. According to BIA Chairman Finucane: "in practice, only a small part of the Board's
decisions are formally reviewed by the Attorney General ...on the average, annually not
more than 12." Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropria-
tions, Department of justice Appropriations for 1956, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1955).
90. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 15 (1938).
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deals with highly controversial issues, public confidence in ifs inde-
pendence rests on at least two factors: (1) the integrity and ability of
its members, and (2) its structural status. The BIA ranks very high on
the first of these requirements, but-for ieasons beyond its control-
lamentably lower on the second. The BIA is highly regarded by the Bar;
its members are held in high esteem for their integrity, devotion and
learning. The complaint is not with the Board, nor with its actions or
basic procedures,91 but rather with the administrative structure within
which the Board is forced to act. The defect is not with the Board's
composition but rather with its position and with congressional failure
to provide it with statutory sanction. The result is that a quasi-jidicial
Board is at the sufferance of a political officer's whim. This very situation
caused the Supreme Court to remand a case for trial on whether the
Attorney General dictated the BIA's decision, or whether the BIA's deci-
sion was free and untrammeled; the final result was a finding of non-
dictation.92
Condemnation of the non-statutory and tenuous status of the BIA,
and its predecessor Board of Review, has been continuous. In 1931, the
Wickersham Commission recommended the establishment by statute of
an independent Board of Alien Appeals. 3 In 1931, Jane Perry Clark
discussed the need for statutory recognition of the then Board of
Review, and in 1932, Dean Van Vleck's study for the Commonwealth
Fund recommended statutory status.95 In 1940, the Secretary of Labor's
Committee on Administrative Procedure stressed the need for a change in
the Board of Review," and as a result of its report the present BIA was
established, independent of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.9 7
As elsewhere indicated,"" congressional debate in 1952, during the enact-
91. See Finucane, Procedure Before the Board of Immigration Appeals, 31 Interpreter
Releases 26 (1954). As to constitutionality of any delegation to BIA, see 42 InI. B.J. 657
(1954).
92. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955) ; United States ex
rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). After the first Accardi case, the Attorney
General issued Order 45-54, to the BIA, special inquiry officers and all others exercising
hearing powers in deportation cases, saying that where the Attorney General had delegated
power to hear and decide, "those charged with the duty of hearing and deciding must give
each alien a fair and impartial trial, without prejudgment on the basis of assertions of any
official having the function of prosecuting these cases." (April 23, 1954).
93. National Comm'n on Law Observance & Enforcement, Report on Enforcement of
the Deportation Laws of the United States 160-62, 178 (1931).
94. Clark, Deportation of Aliens from the United States to Europe 381, 387 (1931).
95. Van Vleck, The Administiative" Control of-Aliens 247-48 (1932).
96. Secretary of Labor's Committee on Adihinistrative Procedure, The Immigration and
Naturalization Service 99 (1940). This is the so-called Dimock Commiftee.
97. Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees- on the, judiciary on S. 716, H:R. 2379,
H.R. 28i6, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 672 '(1951).
98. See pp. 155-56 and notes 67-68 supra; Maslow, supra note 74, at 358-59. H.R. 3364,
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ment of the present law, displayed discomfort with the present situation.
Within months of the act's passage, substantial dissatisfaction with the
BIA's structural status was expressed during the nation-wide hearings
of the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization."
And in 1953, the President's Commission recommended statutory status
for a Board of Immigration and Visa Appeals.1"0
In 1955, the Task Force on Legal Services & Procedure, of the
(Second) Hoover Commission, recommended the creation of an Admin-
istrative Court, with an Immigration Section. 101
And in February 1958, the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association adopted the following resolution approved by its Section of
Administrative Law:
WHEREAS the Board of Immigration Appeals of the Department of Justice is
established by regulation only, with no statutory assurance of either its existence or
jurisdiction,
BE IT RESOLVED that it is the opinion of the American Bar Association that the
Board of Immigration Appeals of the Department of Justice be granted statutory status
and authority and that the Section of Administrative Law be authorized and directed to
advance appropriate legislation to that end.1
02
One further aspect merits special comment. The BIA is authorized to
exercise all the discretion vested by law in the Attorney General. 0 3 That
this is a significant aspect of its functions appears from the statistics that
of all the appeals sustained by the BIA, as many, and often more, are
sustained in matters of discretion as are in matters of law."°4 However,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107 (1957), would establish a BIA "which shall be an independent
entity attached to the Bureau [of Immigration and Citizenship created by the bill] for ad-
ministrative purposes." Its nine members are to be appointed by the President for nine
year terms, subject to Senate confirmation. This Board would also have the right to
review visa denials.
99. Pres. Com. Hearings at 2070.
100. Pres. Com. Rep. c. 11. The Board would also hear appeals from consular denials of
visas.
101. Commission on Organization of Executive Branch of Government, Task Force
Report on Leggl Services and Procedure 269-80 (1955). Nine task force members voted
for this recommendation, 3 against and 2 refrained from voting. This proposal was not
adopted by the Hoover Commission itself.
102. 10 Ad. L. Bull. 10 (1957). If immigration and nationality responsibilities are con-
solidated into one agency, as recommended in Part I supra, it would presumably then be in
order to consolidate the BIA with the Board of Visa Appeals. See note 57 supra, Such, in
effect, was the Board of Immigration and Visa Appeals recommended by the President's
Commission. Pres. Com. Rep. c. 11.
103. 8 C.F.R. § 6.1(d) (1) (1958); Finucane, supra note 91; Hearings before the Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Justice Appropriations
for 1958, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1957).
104. Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 320 (1956) (10% of all appeals sustained as matter of




the Hoover Commission's Task Force would deny to its proposed Im-
migration Section of the Administrative Court any authority to act on
matters of administrative discretion.105 On the other hand, the President's
Commission would not divest its recommended statutory Board of author-
ity to decide in matters involving discretion. °8 And the House Judiciary
Committee, while not recommendng statutory status, directed the Attorney
General not to alter the Board's functions "in any way." °7 Experience
with the BIA's actions in the field of discretion in the past fifteen or so
years, coupled with the importance of such discretionary authority0 8 in
the light of the rigidities of the 1952 Act, led to the conviction that the
national welfare would best be served by adopting the view of the Presi-
dent's Commission in this respect and retaining in the statutory BIA
authority over matters of discretion.
Whatever may have been the earlier justification, if any, the absence of
statutory sanction and jurisdiction for the BIA is now a most regrettable
and undesirable situation. The status of the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals should no longer be left to the uncertainty of regulation. The
Board's. continued existence, and its jurisdiction, including authority in
discretionary matters, should be assured by congressional enactment.
Reform Number Four-Hearings on the Record, in
Exclusion Proceedings
Every alien who, in the judgment of the examining immigration officer,
"9may not appear... to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land"'1
is entitled to a hearing before a special inquiry officer whose determina-
tion "shall be based only on the evidence produced at the inquiry.""110
If such decision is adverse, the excluded alien is entitled to an appeal to
the Attorney General I" who has delegated this appeal to the Board of Im-
migration Appeals." 2 The Board's decision on appeal "shall be rendered
solely upon the evidence adduced before the special inquiry officer." 13
However, where it appears to either the examining immigration officer
105. Task Force, supra note 101, at 278. The Wickersham Commission and Secretary
of Labor's Committee would have restricted their proposed Boards to "quasi-judicial"
functions. See notes 93, 96 supra.
106. Pres. Com. Rep. at 164.
107. See note 68 supra.
108. The Supreme Court has shown its regard for the importance of this discretionary
authority in the BIA, in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), and in United States
ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
109. Act of 1952 § 235(a).
110. Id. § 236(a).
111. Id. § 236(b).
'112. 8 C.F.R. § 6.1(b) (1) (1958).
113. Act of 1952§ 236(b).
1958]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
or to the special inquiry officer that the alien may be excludable under
specified provisions of the law dealing with exclusions for public safety,
security or subversive activity,114 the hearing before the special inquiry
officer is deferred and the case referred to the Attorney General. In his
discretion, the Attorney General may order the alien to be excluded with-
out the hearing otherwise provided, if he is satisfied that the alien is ex-
cludable "on the basis of information of a confidential nature, the dis-
closure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest." " In such
event, there is no appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 118 The
constitutionality of such exclusions without hearing has been upheld by
the Supreme Court."'
Exclusions without hearing were instituted by presidential proclamation
in 1941118 immediately prior to our entry into World War II. According
to the General Counsel of the Immigration Service at that time, this
practice was intended to provide very special powers to cover exceptional
and extraordinary cases during a wartime period." 9 However, what
started out to be "a very extraordinary provision in a real shooting war"
ended up with being "routine."' 2 °
What sort of evidence becomes "confidential" under this proceeding?
The Immigration Service's chief officer overseas during the displaced
persons program testified before a Senate Committee that in "doubtful
cases" where they have no "absolute proof" but only "weak" evidence,
the "source" of which "is no longer available," the information is placed
in the "confidential" category although it "would not be sufficient to
exclude by the normal board of special inquiry proceedings because those
proceedings must be conducted in a manner in which they could not be
subject to attack in a court of the United States." 121
More recently a subcommittee of the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations took testimony on the use of confidential information
114. Id. § 212(a) (27), (28), (29).
115. Id. § 235(c). The Attorney General has delegated this decision to the regional
commissioners of the Service. 8 C.F.R. §§ 9.5(q), 235.8(b), (c) (1958).
116. 8 C.F.R. § 235.8(c) (1958). See Pres. Com. Hearings at 1968; H.R. Rep. No. 1365,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1952).
117. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) ; United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
118. Proc. No. 2523, Nov. 14, 1941, 55 Stat. 1696, pursuant to authority of the Act of
June 21, 1941, c. 210, § 1, 55 Stat. 252. See Pres. Com. Hearings at 1964-65. The practice
was given statutory sanction by the Internal Security Act of 1950, c. 1024, 64 Stat. 987
(codified in scattered sections of 18, 22, 50 U.S.C.), from which it was carried forward into
the Act of 1952.
119. Pres. Com. Hearings at 13, 16.
120. Hearings, supra note 97, at 139. See also Pres. Com. Rep. at 229.
121. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Amendments to the Displaced Persons Act,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 664-65 (1949-50).
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in deportation hearings. A special inquiry officer described such informa-
tion as "what might be termed as hearsay evidence, which could not be
gotten in the record."" An investigator testified that "some of these con-
fidential reports were merely information received off the street." 123 Un-
der such circumstances, how can the alien protect himself and the United
States Government against "confidential" information which turns out to
be nothing more than malicious denunciations without any factual sub-
stance? 124
The statute2 5 and the regulations2 6 require that no information be
labelled "confidential" for the purpose of denial of a hearing in exclusion
proceedings unless its disclosure "would be prejudicial to the public
interest, safety or security." Despite this restriction, a variety of informa-
tion has been designated as "confidential" which has no necessary rela-
tion to security or to the national safety. For example, the Immigration
Service's Investigator's Manual 7 refers to non-record or "confidential"
information which is not classified defense information,' and also con-
tains the following statement:
[Iln certain types of cases requiring reports of character investigation, a report
containing unfavorable information cannot be placed in evidence if such information is
based on confidential records or if adverse witnesses are unwilling to testify.' 29
This pattern is sufficiently repetitious to raise the query whether dif-
ficulty of proof is sufficient reason for designating information as "con-
fidential."
The philosophic issue here is, of course, security against liberty. Despite
the fact that the officials who order exclusions without a hearing are moti-
vated by their highest ideals of patriotism, Justice Brandeis' warning is
still valid, that:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
government's purposes are beneficent .... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning, but without understanding.
130
122. Hearings, supra note 86, at 67, 78.
123. Id. at 18, 20, 45, 55.
124. See Maslow, supra note 74, at 356.
125. Act of 1952, § 235(c).
126. 8 C.F.R. § 235.8(b) (1958).
127. This is a confidential document described and excerpted by the House Committee
on Government Operations, Sixth Intermediate Report, Practices & Procedures of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service in Deportation Proceedings, H.R. Rep. No. 1458,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955).
128. Hearings, supra note 86, at 207.
129. Report, supra note 127, at 6 (emphasis added) ; Maslow, supra note 74, at 354.
130. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (dissenting opinion). The
majority decision sustaining use of evidence obtained by wire tapping has been mooted
by the Federal Communications Act of June 13, 1934, 48 Stat.-1064, 1104, 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1952). See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 801 (1957); Nardone v. United States, 308
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Justice Frankfurter warned against the reliability of "confidential"
information:
We can take judicial notice of the fact that in conspicuous instances, not negligible in
number, such 'confidential information' has turned out to be either baseless or false. There
is no reason to believe that only these conspicuous instances illustrate the hazards inherent
in taking action affecting the lives of fellow men on the basis of such information. The
probabilities are to the contrary. A system of administrative law cannot justify itself on
the assumption that the 'confidential information' . . . is impregnable or even likely to
be true.13 '
Justice Douglas has also spoken of the unreliability of "faceless inform-
ers":
Dr. Peters was condemned by faceless informers, some of whom were not known even
to the Board that condemned him. Some of these informers were not even under oath.
None of them had to submit to cross-examination. None had to face Dr. Peters. So far
as we or the Board know, they may be psychopaths or venal people, like Titus Oates,
who revel in being informers. They may bear old grudges. Under cross-examination their
stories might disappear like bubbles. Their whispered confidences might turn out to be
yarns conceived by twisted minds or by people who, though sincere, have poor faculties
of observation and memory.' 3 2
Such admonitions of the untrustworthiness of "confidential informa-
tion" have proved accurate in the area under discussion. Where independ-
ent evaluation and objective appraisal of "confidential information" has
been made by judicial, congressional or other administrative means, the
"confidential" evidence has been proved to be unworthy of reliance. For
example, in one case the Government admitted in federal court that its
so called "confidential" evidence was not actually evidence at all but
mere suspicion. In United States ex rel. Lee Till Seem v. Shaughnessy,3'
an alien wife of an American citizen was detained for over four months
without a hearing and without being advised of the basis for the detention
or the nature of the charges. The Government refused to give any facts,
but admitted that no security issue was involved. The court accepted
from the Government an affidavit in camera, on the alleged ground that
premature disclosure might impede the investigation. The affidavit gave
no facts and frankly stated: "Of course, the difficulty lies in whether the
Government will be able to develop sufficient evidence to establish the
obvious [sic] fact." The court ruled for the alien, saying that there
were "mere allegations of suspicion, unsupported by evidential facts ...
U.S. 338 (1939), reversing 106 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379
(1937), reversing 90 F.2d 630 (2d Cir.).
131. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 373 (1956) (dissenting opinion). Harold Laski wrote
to Holmes that, "if an executive decision can't in the last analysis be defended by the
Government before the Courts there is probably something the matter with it." Holmes-
Laski Letters 107 (Howe ed. 1953).
132. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 350-51 (1955) (concurring opinion).
133. 104 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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To permit her continued detention under present circumstances and with-
out a hearing comes close to those concepts of State power which are
abhorrent to our way of life.' 13 4
In another case, suspension of deportation had been denied administra-
tively on the basis of confidential information relating to the alien's "good
moral character." After being shown the confidential file in question, the
court ruled that a question arose as to the credibility of the Service's
sources of information, and consequently ordered a full hearing.'
In the Ellen Knauff case, "due largely to a wave of newspaper publi-
city..., administrative and congressional hearings brought to light the
tenuous nature of the evidence on which exclusion was based," 136 despite
the constitutionality of the procedure. 13 7 Here, a serviceman's war bride
was excluded without a hearing. The court denied mandamus. 138 Her
writ of habeas corpus was dismissed,139 and the Supreme Court, by a four
to three vote, affirmed dismissal. 4° A second writ was likewise dis-
missed.' 41 Within four months after the first Supreme Court decision,
the House passed a private bill to clear her status'4 but the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee killed the bill. Appropriately intervening also was a
stay order from a Justice of the Supreme Court to stop deportation.
After twice ordering Mrs. Knauff excluded without a hearing (once in
1948 and again in 1949), the Attorney General in March 1951 ordered a
hearing before a Board of Special Inquiry, the then normal hearing body,
on the ground that certain portions of the original confidential informa-
tion could by this time be disclosed without being prejudicial. For the
first time, after two and one-half years, she learned the charges against
her, that allegedly she passed secret data to an Iron Curtain country, and
was given an opportunity to defend herself. This Board ruled her exclud-
able, and the Assistant Commissioner of Immigration affirmed the order.
On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the order of ex-
clusion and ordered her admitted because "there was not adequate evi-
dence to justify the order of exclusion." After an extensive analysis of all
the evidence produced against the alien by the Attorney General's Im-
134. Id. at 820, 821.
135. Ex parte Mota Singh Chohan, 122 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
136. Kimball, Rights of Aliens in Exclusion Proceedings, 3 Utah L. Rev. 349, 354 (1953).
137. See note 117 supra.
138. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 88 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 179 F.2d 628 (2d
Cir. 1950).
139. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Watkins, 173 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1950).
140. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
141. United States ex rel. Knauff v. McGrath, 181 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1950), dismissed as
moot, 340 U.S. 940 (1951).
142. H.R. 7614, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). See Hearings Before the Subcommittee No.




migration and Naturalization Service, the Attorney General's Board of
Immigration Appeals came to the following conclusion:
Do we have in this case more than uncorroborated hearsay to establish the premise
upon which the inference is drawn? . . .We do not .... The sum total then of all the
testimony is hearsay .. .uncorroborated by direct evidence, and that, says the Supreme
Court, does not constitute substantial evidence. 143
The BIA certified the case to the Attorney General for review, and Gen-
eral McGrath approved the BIA's order to admit the alien.
The Knauff case has an unusual additional point. One of her major
supporters was Congressman Francis E. Walter, co-author of the Act of
1952 and Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
After being shown the official file on Mrs. Knauff, Congressman Walter
said: "It looked to me like a lot of gossip and nonsense .... [T]here is
nothing to warrant even a reasonable suspicion.""
Thus, after two exclusion orders by the Attorney General, four district
court decisions, four court of appeals decisions, two Supreme Court de-
cisions and a stay from one of its Justices, congressional hearings and
action, and two administrative hearings, Mrs. Knauff was admitted and
the nation has survived disclosure of the "confidential" information in-
volved.
But how many other equally unjustly treated aliens were not able to
obtain the opportunity of self-defense? Justice Jackson described the
Knauff case as "a near miss, saved by further administrative and congres-
sional hearing from perpetrating an injustice.' 4 5 Whatever else the case
may mean, it "strikingly illustrates the injustice which can result from
decisions cloaked under this regulation.' '1
46
Despite its constitutional validity, the use of confidential information
has been recognized by a Congressional Committee and by the Commis-
sioner of Immigration and Naturalization to be basically improper.
A House Congressional Committee investigating deportation procedures
reached a conclusion on the use of confidential information, which is rele-
vant here in principle:
The use of confidential information as a basis for granting or denying relief is at
complete variance with basic common law precepts. The subcommittee has therefore
developed concern over (a) the use of confidential information in arriving at a decision
143. In re Knauff, 1 Pike & Fischer, Ad. L. Dec. (2d ser.) 639, 641, 644 (BIA 1951);
Knauff, The Ellen Knauff Story app. (1952).
144. Knauff, The Ellen Knauff Story 181 (1952); 98 Cong. Rec. 4401 (1952).
145. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 225 (1953) (dissenting
opinion).
146. Kimball, supra note 136. See also Konvitz, Civil Rights in Immigration 46 (1953).
For the mischief that can develop as a result of this practice, see Maetzu v. Brownell, 132
F. Supp. 751 (D.D.C. 1955) (special inquiry officer granted voluntary departure; BIA
reversed on basis of confidential information).
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of this kind, and (b) the authority of a nonpolicy making official to determine what
should remain undisclosed because disclosure may be prejudicial to public interest,
safety, or security.147
And in 1956, the Commissioner announced a new policy relating to the
use of confidential information in connection with applications for dis-
cretionary relief from deportation. Confidential information would be
used in such matters "only when the most compelling reasons involving
the national safety or security are present," and then only when: "the
Commissioner has personally reviewed the case and has satisfied himself
that every effort to develop evidence through Service investigation and
investigation by other Governmental agencies has been exhausted." 145
The Commissioner is to be commended for this welcome and heartening
policy change, not only for what it does but also because it betokens rec-
ognition of the problem. Nevertheless the basic issue cannot be solved
by a mere shift in administrative policy.149 Furthermore, under current
regulations, final determination of the use of confidential information as a
basis for exclusion without a hearing is not vested either in the Attorney
General or the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, both
of whom are presidential appointees confirmed by the Senate, but in
the Regional Commissioners. 5 °
Others have urged the need for a thorough-going policy change here.
In 1953, the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization
concluded that "the present situation in connection with exclusion with-
out hearing is unsatisfactory. The protection of a right to a fair hearing
is essential to a democracy." To preserve "the American concept of fair
play" and also protect the nation's security, that Commission recom-
mended that determination as to whether an alien should be excluded
without a hearing, on the basis of confidential information, should be made
by its proposed statutory Board of Immigration and Visa Appeals.' 51
In 1955, the American Bar Association likewise took note of this un-
satisfactory situation by adopting the following resolution:
BE IT RESOLVED, that it is the opinion of the American Bar Association that an
alien should not be excluded except upon record evidence taken at a hearing, provided,
however, that proper provision be made in security cases for safeguarding the confi-
dential information and the sources of confidential information relied on, and that the
147. Report, supra note 127, at 14.
148. Immigration & Naturalization Service, Press Release, Oct. 31, 1956; N.Y. Times,
Nov. 4, 1956, § 4E, p. 12, col. 2; 33 Interpreter Release 364 (Nov. 1, 1956). The regulation
itself permits the special inquiry officer to consider "non-record" information "only when
the Commissioner has determined that it is in the category of national security and safety
to do so." 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1958).
149. See 59 W. Va. L. Rev. 199, 201 (1957).
150. 8 C.F.R. §§ 9.5a(q), 235.8(b) (1958).
151. Pres. Com. Rep. at 228-31.
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Section of Administrative Law be authorized and directed to advance appropriate
legislation to that end.152
While protecting both the source of the confidential information and the
confidential information itself, the American Bar Association's resolution
would require that the alien be provided with notice of the nature of the
"charges" against him. Less than this cannot be said to be just or fair.
More than this, in fact, was contemplated by Congressman Walter's own
version of the 1952 bill in which he would have provided that "nothing in
this Act shall be construed to authorize the denial of a hearing to any alien
who has arrived in the United States." 53 This provision would have re-
turned the practice to that which prevailed for fifty-eight years prior to
1941, that no alien could be excluded without a hearing.'54
It is indeed a sad day when the United States Government must resort
to star chamber proceedings and deny a hearing simply because it wishes
to use weak and uncorroborated evidence which it knows will not be suf-
ficient in administrative hearings and will never stand up in court. The
needs of national security can be met within the purpose of the American
Bar Association's resolution without enforcement techniques "which
shock the common man's sense of decency and fair play."' 55
B. Procedure
"The history of liberty," said Justice Frankfurter, "has largely been
the history of observance of procedural safeguards." 15 Justice Jackson
wrote that "procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable
essence of liberty"; "differences in the process of admiiiistration make all
the difference between a reign of terror and one of law." 17 It is signifi-
cant that procedural safeguards constitute the major part of our Bill of
Rights.'"
Certain ways of doing things are part of our national tradition and have
become part of "the very ethos of the scheme of our society." 1'9 It is to
such overriding considerations that the Administrative Procedure Act is
addressed. 60
152. See note 57 supra.
153. H.R. 2379, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 292 (1951). However, the Senate version in
S. 716 prevailed.
154. Pres. Com. Rep. at 229.
155. Bundeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921) (dissenting opinion).
156. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
157. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224, 226 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
158. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951).
159. Id. at 172.




Reform Number Five-Applicability of the Administrative
Procedure Act
The integrity of the hearing process rests as much on the impartiality
of the hearing officer as on any single factor. Can a litigant obtain, or just
as importantly, can he be made to feel and see that he can obtain,'" a
fair hearing under a procedure where (1) the same person may be prose-
cutor, judge and jury, and (2) the hearing officer is not, or may not con-
ceive himself to be, independent of the enforcement agency whose decision
is on appeal to him?
Two characteristics162 are crucial to what the Supreme Court called
the "mood" of the Administrative Procedure Act.'63 First, the act sought
to assure the existence of a corps of independent hearing examiners, free
from supervision, rating, compensation, promotion or removal at the hands
of enforcement or prosecuting officials.'6" The principal objective here was
to protect the examiners from being "mere employees of an agency.')165
Second, it sought to require a separation of prosecuting and adjudicating
functions'66 and thus avoid the almost universally condemned com-
mingling of such functions.167 The purpose here was to insulate the hear-
ing officer from direct or indirect influence or pressure from the agency
whose action was under appeal.'68
After the enactment of the act in 1946, the Department of Justice
held the view that it did not apply to proceedings under the immigration
laws.'6 9 However, in 1950 the Supreme Court ruled otherwise in Sung v.
McGrath. 70 Shortly thereafter, the Congress enacted the Supplemental
Appropriation Act of 1951, which provided that "proceedings under law
relating to the exclusion or expulsion of aliens shall hereafter be without
regard to the provisions of Section 5, 7 and 8 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act." 171
161. Cf. 2 Atlay, The Victorian Chancellors 460 (1908).
162. See Heckman, supra note 5.
163. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
164. APA § 11. See President's Conference on Administrative Procedure, Report of the
Committee on Hearing Officers, Appointment and Status of Federal Hearing Officers (1954).
165. H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 1st Seas. 46 (1946).
166. APA 5(c).
167. See Van Vleck, supra note 95; Secretary of Labor's Committee, supra note 96;
Wickersham Commission Report, supra note 93; Clark, supra note 94; Chafee, Free Speech
in the United States 198-201 (1942); Pres. Com. Rep. at 158-62; Task Force, supra note
101, at 182.
168. S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Seas. 17 (1945) ; H. Report, supra note 165, at 30.
169. See Carusi, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 4 Monthly Rev. 95, 101 (1947); Note, The Rights of Aliens in
Deportation Proceedings, 31 Ind. L.J. 218 (1956).
170. 339 U.S. 33 (1950). See Heckman, supra note 5, at 381-86.
171. Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951, c. 1052, § 101, 64 Stat. 1048 (1950).
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The 1952 Act repealed the appropriation act provisions 172 but the state
of law was not certain until 1955 when the Supreme Court ruled that the
Administrative Procedure Act was not applicable to deportation hearings
conducted under the Act of 1952.7
Admitting the statutory inapplicability of the Administrative Procedure
Act in haec verba, are its objectives achieved by the specialized hearing
system provided in the immigration laws? The answer is "No," although
notable administrative efforts have been made along this line. There is
no question that the alien's hearing is not conducted by a hearing officer
independently appointed as envisaged by section 11 of the act. Hearings
in exclusions and deportation proceedings are conducted by special
inquiry officers 7 4 who are such immigration officers'1 5 as are deemed by
the Attorney General to be qualified to conduct such proceedings and
who are "subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties . . .
as the Attorney General shall prescribe.' 7 6
The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization has made special
efforts to remedy, at least in part, the evil of commingled functions. The
regulations were amended in 1956 to provide that in contested deporta-
tion matters, an "examining officer" shall take over the prosecuting
function from the special inquiry officer; where no contest is made on
the issue of deportability, but discretionary relief is requested, this separa-
tion of prosecutory and judicial functions is only permissive and not
mandatory. 7 Under the new regulations, special inquiry officers no
longer report directly to the District Director, but are under the super-
vision of a Chief Special Inquiry Officer (who is "under the executive
direction of the Commissioner") acting through regional special inquiry
officers. 8 Efficiency ratings for special inquiry officers are now prepared
by the regional inquiry officers. 9 The new separation of functions applies
specifically to deportation, but the Attorney General, in seeking to
effectuate the President's Special Message to the Congress on Immigra-
tion, 8 ° proposed legislation authorizing similar separation of functions
172. Act of June 27, 1952, c. 477, § 403(a) (47), 66 Stat. 280.
173. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
174. Act of 1952 §§ 236, 242(b).
175. By delegation from the Attorney General, the Commissioner appoints such officers.
8 C.F.R. § 9.1(b) (1958).
176. Act of 1952 § 101(b) (4). The authority has been delegated to the Commissioner.
177. Deportability of Aliens in the United States, 21 Fed. Reg. 97-102 (1956). See New
Regulations for Hearing Procedures, 33 Interpreter Releases 13, 16 (Jan. 23, 1956). Prior
to this amendment separation of functions in contested deportation proceedings was merely
permissive. 8 C.F.R. § 242.53(f) (1953) (now revoked).
178. 8 C.F.R. § 1.18(a) (1958).
179. See Note, 42 Va. L. Rev. 803, 809 (1956).
180. H.R. Doc. No. 329, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
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in exclusion hearings.""' The Commissioner of Immigration and Natu-
ralization believes that, as a result of these new regulations, "special
inquiry officers are now completely insulated from control or supervision
by officers with enforcement or investigative responsibilities."'8 2
This'change in the regulations governing deportation hearings is im-
portant and desirable, and the Commissioner of Immigration is to be
complimented not only for ifistituting the new practice, but also for his
program of upgrading the special inquiry officers and his efforts to have
competent and well trained lawyers in such positions. However, the very
adoption of this new procedure is proof of official recognition that despite
authorization by the 1952 Act, and Supreme Court clearance on con-
stitutionality, such commingling of prosecuting and adjudicating functions
is undesirable both in theory and in practice. As laudable and commend-
able as the new procedure is, this internal reorganization still falls far
short of accomplishing the Congressional objective in enacting the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, because the present organizational structure
within which special inquiry officers must function is basically unsound.
A Congressional Committee which investigated the Immigration
Service's hearing procedure came to the following conclusion:
The fact that all of the quasi-judicial proceedings are conducted by personnel who are
subject to appointment by the Attorney General may raise some doubt in the minds of
respondents as to the complete impartiality of the hearings conducted by the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service.' 8 3
Although issued prior to the 1956 change in regulations, and specifically
directed to deportation proceedings, this congressional conclusion goes to
the heart of the difficulty. Special inquiry officers are still ultimately
subordinate to prosecuting officials,"4 -and are fully aware that Congress
was told that one of their number who aroused the Commissioner's ire
will have no future advancement.8 5 So long as this situation prevails,
even the ablest special inquiry officer is subject to real, if implicit,
pressure in close and difficult cases where the Commissioner has taken a
181. Letter to Vice President and Speaker, Feb. 8, 1956, 102 Cong. Rec. 2287 (1956).
See S. 1006, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1955), to amend § 236(a) of the Act of 1952; H.R.
4205, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1957). Cf. Matter of KHC, 5 I. & N. Dec. 312, 314 (1953).
182. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Ann. Rep. 15 (1956). See also Hearings
Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, Department of
Justice Appropriations for 1958, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 171-72 (1957); Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on the House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Justice Appropria-
tions for 1957, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 270 (1956) ; Hearings Before the Senate- Committee on
Appropriations, Department of Justice Appropriations for 1957, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 138
(1956).
183. See Report, supra note 127, at 14.
184. See Note, 42 Va. L. Rev. 803, 821 (1956).
185. Hearings, supra note 86, at 120.
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strong and determined enforcement position.186 Even where such doubt is
unjustified in the specific case, the institutional process is compromised.
Where a special inquiry officer is appointed, supervised, and rated ulti-
mately by enforcement officials, albeit one step removed, and where the
relative degree of independence provided by the new regulations is
known to be a matter of administrative sufferance, revocable at will by
the supervising enforcement officials, it is straining at human nature to
expect true judicial independence from the special inquiry officer whose
career and future advancement is still completely in the hands of enforce-
ment officials and who is hearing appeals on controversial issues and
unsettled questions of law and policy, on which his rulings affect Service
policy and practice."8 7
The absence of any true independence for special inquiry officers is
illustrated in the Brancato case which was investigated by a Congressional
Committee."8 On two separate occasions,8 9 the Supreme Court noted
that in this case the Commissioner disciplined a special inquiry officer
for the manner of his conduct of a deportation hearing. The Brancato
case is cited here not in defense of the merits of the alien's case, but
only because the case shows that special inquiry officers do not really
have independence from enforcement officers who ultimately supervise
their activity. The regulations have been changed since, and perhaps in
part because of, that case; but the ultimate control by enforcement officials
still remains. To what avail is protecting the "judicial function" of the
special inquiry officer' by partial separation of functions,' if judicial
independence is denied him?
The Congressional Committee which studied the Brancato case reached
the following significant conclusion:
Although it undoubtedly would be costly in routine cases to subject the Service to the
expense of procedures required by the Administrative Procedures Act, the Service should
undertake current studies to ascertain the feasibility of applying APA rules of pro-
cedure in some areas of its responsibility. While the preservation and protection of
civil rights may be more costly, it is a justified expenditure.19 2
186. In the case of Nicolae Malaxa, A-6421949 (exclusion), the examining officer assigned
to the case was the Deputy Assistant Commissioner, as "Assistant Examining Officer." Brief
for Alien, Nov. 1957.
187. Cf. Branse, Role of the Service Representative Before the Board of Immigration
Appeals, 5 I. & N. Rep. 1, 3 (July 1957).
188. Hearings, supra note 86, at 127.
189. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 318-19 (1955); Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280, 282 (1955). Finally, it was judicially held that Brancato was
not deportable. United States ex rel. Brancato v. Lehmann, 239 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1956).
190. Task Force, supra note 101, at 272.
191. See Matter of P-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 392, 402-03 (1953) (not unfair for special inquiry
officers to examine Service's file before hearing). But cf. Govt. Oper. Survey, supra note
82, at 750.
192. See Report, supra note 127, at 14. As to costs, see Pres. Com. Rep. at 165.
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The important steps taken by the Commissioner, to insulate the special
inquiry officers from supervision by enforcement officials, cannot achieve
full separation of functions because they are within the framework of an
organizational structure which subordinates the special inquiry officer to
enforcement officials. As another example of this, take what happens to
the special inquiry officer's decision. Both the alien' 93 and the examining
officer who prosecuted the case"4 may appeal to the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals. But this is not all. Where the decision admits the alien,
the District Director (a high-ranking enforcement official) may require
the case to be referred to him "for review" so that he may appeal it to
the BIA.'195 And to move still higher up in the enforcement hierarchy,
the Regional Commissioner "may direct that any case or class of cases
be certified to him."' 96 If it be a case appealable to the Board, he may
certify it to the Board for review of the special inquiry officer's deci-
Sion; 197 if it be outside the BIA's jurisdiction, the Regional Commissioner
"may enter such decision as he deems appropriate." 98 And the Com-
missioner himself or an Assistant Commissioner, may likewise appeal an
inquiry officer's decision on deportation 19 9 or exclusion, 00 by certifying
the case to the BIA.201
If the prosecuting examining officer (who represents the Immigration
and Naturalization Service at the hearing) may appeal the decision, why
is it necessary to authorize a complex system of appeals initiated on the
very highest levels of prosecuting and enforcement officials, except for
control of the special inquiry officer's actions by such officials?
There is another example of the subordination, in fact, of special
inquiry officers to enforcement officials. The BIA has jurisdiction on
appeal from decisions of special inquiry officers involving the exercise
of discretion. In contested deportation cases, as has already been noted,
a laudable effort is made to prevent commingling of functions. But in
cases where deportability is not contested, and the only issue is an
193. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.15, 242.15(b) (1958). The District Director, as well as the special
inquiry officers and BIA, may extend the alien's time for filing a brief. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.15(a),
235.16 (1958).
194. 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.9(a), 242.20 (1958). See Matter of N-, A-10750962, Interim
Decision #867 (BIA, May 31, 1957).
195. 8 C.F.R. § 236.16 (1958).
196. Id. § 7.1(b).
197. Id. § 6.1(c).
198. Id. § 7.1(b)-(d).
199. Id. § 6.1(b) (1).
200. Id. § 6.1(b)(2).
201. Id. § 6.1(c). At the outset, when the BIA was established, the Commissioner had
no authority to require certification of cases to the Attorney General. Att'y Gen. Ann.
Rep. 235 (1941). Then, the Commissioner could obtain review if the BIA agreed. 8 C.F.R.
§ 90.12 (1949). Now, the Commissioner can obtain automatic review.
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application for discretionary relief, separation of functions is not re-
quired and the special inquiry officer's action is directly subject to the
Regional Commissioner's surveillance. Where the officer grants discre-
tionary relief in the nature of suspension of deportation, the case is
referred to the Regional Commissioner for approval. If approved, the
case goes to Congress for action; 202 if the Regional Commissioner dis-
approves the favorable exercise of discretion, the enforcement officer
cannot reverse the special inquiry officer's decision but may certify the
case (with his reasons for disapproval) to the BIA for review.2"'
The significance of the surveillance of special inquiry officers by
enforcement officers in non-contested deportation proceedings can be
estimated statistically. Deportability is contested in only one-fifth of the
deportation hearings; thus, eighty per cent of all deportation hearings
are for the purpose of considering applications for discretionary relief.2'
Is it reasonable to assume that the special inquiry officer can or will be
uninfluenced by the actions and rulings of so high an enforcement officer
in what amounts to a de novo review of eighty per cent of all his actions
and decisions in deportation matters?
In one respect, the regulations show that special inquiry officers are
not regarded as independent quasi-judicial officers, but rather as em-
ployees on special assignments who are subject to other non-judicial
assignments and to supervision as deemed necessary. The act authorizes
the Attorney General to withhold deportation where, in his opinion, an
alien would be subject to physical persecution.0 5 Final determination of
claims for withholding of deportation under this provision of law has
been delegated to the Regional Commissioners. However, the regulations
provide that before a Regional Commissioner may act on such a case,
a special inquiry officer shall hold "an interrogation under oath," and
then prepare for the Regional Commissioner a memorandum of findings
and a recommended decision which are served on the alien and as to which
the alien may file exceptions with the Regional Commissioner. 20 6 This
is not regarded as a judicial function based on an adversary proceeding
because final decision is made by an enforcement officer, the Regional
Commissioner, and a right of appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals
is expressly denied.2"7
This new system for dealing with such claims of persecution0 8 is a
202. 8 C.F.R. §§ 8.1, 8.2 (1958).
203. Id. § 7.1(b). Another example is the special inquiry officer's lack of control over
bail, a power given to the district director. Id. § 242.2 (subject to appeal, id. 6.1(b) (7)).
204. Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 421 (1956) ; Task Force, supra note 101.
205. Act of 1952 § 243(h).
206. 8 C.F.R. § 243(b) (2) (1958).
207. See Govt. Oper. Survey, supra note 82, at 728, 736; 8 C.F.R. § 243(b) (3) (1958).
208. The practice started in 1955. See Immigration and Naturalization Service, Ann.
Rep. 18 (1955). Prior to this new practice, it had been held that no "classical
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welcome and desirable improvement over the earlier practice, and it is
hoped no comment here made will adversely affect its continuance
under present circumstances. 20 9 However, it illustrates the fact that,
despite excellent efforts to provide for separation of prosecuting and
deciding functions, special inquiry officers are not really insulated from
enforcement pressures and influences.
The conclusion is inescapable that the structure of the present hearing
system in immigration cases, by very reason of its non-conformity with
the Administrative Procedure Act, may inhibit true independence on the
part of the special inquiry officers. Of course there are special inquiry
officers who have demonstrated complete independence. But the un-
soundness of the organizational structure within which they operate is
the critical issue.
The applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act to immigration
hearings has long been under discussion. The President's Commission
recommended that the act be made applicable to deportation hearings but
not to exclusion proceedings. 10 The American Bar Association has gone
further and would make it applicable to hearings "in all alien matters":
BE IT RESOLVED, That it is the opinion of the American Bar Association that in
all alien matters in which an administrative hearing is required to be had by statute or the
Constitution, the hearing officer be duly appointed under Section 11 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act and be governed by all the relevant provisions of Sections 5, 7 and 8
of that Act.21 '
The American Bar Association, a constant champion of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act,2 12 would thus restore the situation to that prevailing
under the Supreme Court's decision in the Sung case. 12
To adopt the American Bar Association's position would also comply
with the avowed intent of the authors of the Act of 1952 (who also
sponsored the Administrative Procedure Act), and with the assurances
administrative hearing" was necessary under § 243(h). Namkung v. Boyd, 226 ,F.2d 385
(9th Cir. 1955). But see United States ex rel. Paschalldis v. District Director, 143 F. Supp.
310, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (Attorney General's action reviewable "where the requirements
of appropriate procedural due process have not been observed.").
209. For the need of improvement in the prior system of handling § 243(h) cases, see
Report of the Special Subcommittee of the House Commtitee on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep.
No. 1570, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 69 (1955). The Immigration and Naturalization
Service has undertaken an exhaustive investigation of § 243(h) cases. Wright Report, supra
note 18, at 582.
210. Pres. Com. Rep. at 164-66.
211. See note 57 supra.
212. See Rhyne, The Administrative Procedure Act: Five-Year Review Finds Protections
Eroded, 37 A.B.AJ. 641 (1951).
213. See note 170 supra. Specifically in relation to special inquiry officers, see Deale, A
Major Reform Proposed: The Administrative ,Procedure Reorganization Act, 44 A.B.A.J.
133, 136 (1958).
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which they gave to the Congress. In floor debate on the bill which became
the Act of 1952, Senator McCarran stated that:
The Administrative Procedure Act is made applicable to the bill. The Administrative
Procedure Act prevails now. 214
Congressman Walter, in the course of House debate on the bill, said:
What do we do in this act? Instead of destroying the Administrative Procedure Act,
we undo what Congress did in a deficiency appropriation bill several years ago when
it legislated to overturn a decision of the Supreme Court which ruled that the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act is applicable to deportation proceedings. We undo that. So here,
instead of our destroying the Administrative Procedure Act, we actually see that it is
reinstated in every instance.215
And again:
[T]he law as it was before the House adopted this amendment to an appropriation
bill, has been reinstated and . . . the decision of the Supreme Court in the Sung case
will be the law of the land when this code is adopted.21 6
Thus, whatever may be the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
legislative history of the Act of 1952,217 the Congress was assured by the
bill's co-authors (who were the Committee spokesmen for the measure)
that the Administrative Procedure Act was applicable and that the law
would be as declared by the Supreme Court in the Sung case. Thus,
adoption of the American Bar Association's proposals on this score will
bring about the happy coincidence of what is right and ought to be done,
as well as what will comply with the avowed intentions of the present
law's co-sponsors. The Act of 1952 should be amended to achieve this
result, to the end that deportation and exclusion hearings shall be con-
ducted by hearing officers who are appointed under, and in accordance
with, the Administrative Procedure Act.
III. JUDIcIAL R-vIEw
Professor Jaffe has recently written:
[T]he availability of judicial review is, in our system and under our tradition, the
necessary premise of legal validity . . . . The guarantee of legality by an organization
independent of the executive is one of the profoundest, most pervasive premises of our
system.218
214. 98 Cong. Rec. 5778 (1952).
215. 98 Cong. Rec. 4302 (1952), in debate on H.R. 5678, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
216. 98 Cong. Rec. 4416 (1952). H.R. 3364, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 108(a) (1957), requires
all but rule-making hearings to be conducted either by the statutory BIA it establishes or
by hearing examiners appointed and assigned pursuant to APA § 11. See also APA § 10.
217. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955). (The decision was 5 to 3, and two
members of the majority have since retired.)
218. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review I, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1958).
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This view has been recognized in Congress:
Among the primary safeguards of our American way of life is the doctrine of official
responsibility, the principle that Government officials are servants and not masters, and
that it is more important for the people to scrutinize the conduct of officials than it is
for officials to scrutinize the lives of the people. From this it follows that some form of
judicial protection shall always be open to the victims of injustice, even if the injustice
is committed by persons in powerful position.219
Reform Number Six-Judicial Review of Deportation and Exclusion
I Orders
The immigration law has never specifically provided for judicial review
of either deportation or exclusion orders.2 0 Prior to the enactment of the
Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, it was generally understood that
such orders were reviewable only through habeas corpus proceedings.
221
Did the act change this situation and allow review in injunctions, declara-
tory judgments,2" or petitions of review under section 10?1 The
Supreme Court ruled in 1953, after the effective date of the Act of 1952,
that the Administrative Procedure Act was inapplicable to the pre-1952
immigration law2 4 and that therefore only habeas corpus could be used
to review a deportation order under the 1917 Act.22 5
Under this holding, an alien could obtain judicial review of an adminis-
trative order of deportation only after he had submitted himself to the
"odium of arrest and detention"' 6 and made all personal and business
arrangements for departure. This enormous inconvenience to the alien
was not counterbalanced by any corresponding benefit to the Govern-
ment.2
Everyone concerned recognized that this situation was unsatisfactory.
In 1952, even before the Heikkela case, the Acting Solicitor General
(with the concurrence of the Immigration Service) proposed legislation
to permit judicial review without the limitation of habeas corpus pro-
ceedings.225 Then in January 1954, the Supreme Court, by a four-to-four
219. Minority Report, S. 2550, supra note 47, at 7.
220. Gordon, supra note 8; Pres. Com. Rep. at 168; Report, supra note 209, app. at 68.
See Act of 1952 § 236 (exclusion), § 242(b) (deportation).
221. Pres. Com. Rep. at 168; Letter of Acting Solicitor General of the United States,
Pres. Com. Hearings at 1953.
222. Declaratory judgment Act, 48 Stat. 955 (1934), 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1952).
223. APA § 10.
224. Immigration Act of 1917, § 19(a), 39 Stat. 889, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 155(a)
(1952). (Attorney General's decision "final".)
225. Heikkela v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
226. Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 183 (1957). See Orlow, Habeas Corpus
in Immigration Cases, 10 Ohio St. L.. 314 (1949); Note, 62 Yale L.J. 1000, 1007 (1953).




vote per curiam, affirmed a decision that judicial review of deportation
could be had by declaratory judgment and was not limited to habeas
corpus.229 This inconclusive decision left the law in a highly uncertain
state 30 and the only way out of the dilemma seemed to be through
legislation.23' In March 1954, the Department of Justice sponsored a
bill which would provide a statutory form of judicial review of deportation
(but not exclusion) orders.232 This proposal was an advance over the
law as it then prevailed, and was endorsed in principle by the American
Bar Association.233
However, the uncertainty of the law which was the basis of any need
for legislative clarification, has since been dispelled by two clear Supreme
Court rulings. In 1955, Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro2 4 held that, under the
Act of 1952, deportation orders are reviewable by way of declaratory
judgment. And in December of 1956, Brownell v. Tom We Shung235
applied the same rule to exclusion orders under the Act of 1952.236
The present state of the law on this subject seems quite satisfactory.
In 1957 Congressman Walter expressed full agreement with it.237 And
in February 1958, the American Bar Association adopted the following
resolution opposing any legislative changes in the present situation:
WHEREAS, recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have con-
strued Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act as applicable to deportation and
exclusion orders under the Immigration and Nationality Laws of the United States; and
WHEREAS, legislation has been introduced in the Congress to restrict judicial review
of deportation and exclusion orders under said laws,
BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association favors judicial review, under
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, of deportation and exclusion orders
under the Immigration and Nationality laws of the United States and that the Section of
Administrative Law be authorized and directed to oppose legislation designed to restrict
judicial review of such orders. 23 s
229. Rubinstein v. Brownell, 206 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1953), aff'd, 346 U.S. 929 (1954).
230. See Report, supra note 209, app. at 67; Gordon, supra note 9.
231. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Ann. Rep. 8 (1954) (processed).
232. Department of Justice, Press Release, Mar. 10, 1954. This was sent immediately
after American Bar Association's approval of the bill in principle. See 6 Ad. L. Bull. 126
(1954). The present versions are: S. 1006, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 34 (1957); S. 345, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) ; H.R. 4205, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 34 (1957) . The President's
special messages on immigration justify this proposal as a means of preventing "abuse of
legal process." H.R. Doc. No. 329, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1956); H.R. Doc. No. 85, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
233. 6 Ad. L. Bull. 126 (1954).
234. 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
235. See note 226 supra.
236. See Sutherland, The Supreme Court: 1956 Term, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 85, 187 (1957).
237. See Ball, Judicial Review in Deportation and Exclusion Cases, 34 Interpreter Releases
128, 132 (June 10, 1957) (Letter of March 15, 1957 from Walter to Ball saying: "I fully
agree with the ... Shung case.").
238. 10 Ad. L. Bull. 10 (1957). This resolution was adopted by the Section of Administra-
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Thus, the situation now is completely different from that which, in
1954, was the cause for suggestions of legislative remedy. In view of
the clarification of the issue by the Supreme Court, and the current
satisfactory state of the law in this score, there is no need at this time
for any legislation to deal with judicial review of orders of exclusion or
deportation. 239  Nevertheless, a subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee approved House Report 13,311 (Walter) a bill designed to
restrict and limit judicial review of deportations and exclusion orders.' 3aa
The American Bar Association testified in opposition to this bill on
the grounds that (1) the bill was unnecessary and that there was
no evidence of a major abuse of the judicial process needing legislative
rectification, (2) the form of review, through the courts of appeals rather
than the district courts, was inappropriate to immigration matters, and
(3) in at least ten specified ways, the bill seriously and unwisely re-
stricted judicial review now available under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.3 9b ,
Reform Number Seven-Judicial Determination of
Claim of Citizenship
The Nationality Act of 1940240 gave to all persons claiming American
citizenship, whether in or outside of the country, a right to a judicial
determination of their claims through an action for a declaratory judg-
ment. If resident outside the United States, 4 ' a claimant could obtain
from a consul a certificate of identity to be admitted into the United
tive Law at its Annual Meeting in 1957, and approved by the House of Delegates at its
mid-winter meeting in February 1958.
239. This is not intended to foreclose the possibility of improvement in judicial review
that may result from a general revision of the Administrative Procedure Act.
239a. H.R. 13,311, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. was introduced on. July 7, 1958 to perfect
H.R. 12,487, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. which was introduced on May 13, 1958.
239b. The present author represented the ABA in its testimony. Hearings Before the
Subcommittee No. 1, House Judiciary Committee, "Judicial Review of Deportations and
Exclusion Orders," 85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 19, at 46-60 (1958). Also testifying in op-
position to the bill was the Hon. Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm.
Statements in opposition were filed by: Association of Immigration and Nationality
Lawyers; Immigration Comm. of the Bar Ass'n of the Dist. of Columbia; American
Veterans Comm.; Common Council for Am. Unity; and the Committee on Migration
and Refugee Problems of the Am. Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service.
240. Section 503, 54 Stat. 1171, 8 U.S.C. § 903 (1952). See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325
(1939).
241. Prior to the 1940 Act, nonresident claimants could test their rights only through
habeas corpus in exclusion proceedings. See Note, Establishing Citizenship: Remedies
Available to Persons Outside the United States, 7 Stan. L.- Rev. 360 (1955); Developments in
Law-Immigration & Nationality, Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 643, 743 (1953); A Judicial
Review of Administrative Denial of Citizenship Claims by a Person Not in the United States,
55 Colum. L. Rev. 226 (1955).
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States in order to bring his law suit; if denied such certificate, the over-
seas citizenship claimant could appeal to the Secretary of State. 42
Under this provision, federal courts allowed actions for declaratory
judgment by nonresidents who claimed to be foreign-born children of
American parents.243
The 1952 Act substantially restricted these earlier-granted rights.24
Claimants who are within the United States may still bring action for
a declaratory judgment if a right or privilege as a national of the United
States has been denied by a government agency or official on the ground
of non-nationality; provided, however, that the action may not be
brought if the citizenship question arose in connection with, or became
an issue in, an exclusion proceeding.245 The rights of claimants resident
outside of the United States were, however, rigorously curtailed.2 46 In
the first place, if permitted to come to the United States to make their
claim, they cannot have-as previously-a full scale judicial determina-
tion of their citizenship claim through declaratory judgment. They are
now permitted only to apply for admission into the United States, on the
same footing as any alien, and to test their claims only in exclusion
proceedings24 from which habeas corpus (with its much more limited
scope of review) is stated to be the exclusive form of judicial review.248
Furthermore, the Act of 1952 restricts the groups of claimants who
may even obtain a certificate of identity to come to the United States for
this more limited review of citizenship status. A nonresident claimant
of nationality is not entitled to a certificate of identity unless:
(1) his claim to a right or privilege as a national of the United States has been
denied by an agency or official of the U. S. Government on the ground that he is not a
U. S. national;
(2) his application for such certificate is, to the satisfaction of the diplomatic or
consular officer passing on it, made in good faith and on a substantial basis; and
(3) he has either previously been physically present in the United States, or is a
person under 16 years of age who was born abroad of a U. S. citizen parent.249
According to the State Department's Regulations, the first require-
ment (denial of a right or privilege as a national) is not met where a
242. Act of 1952 § 360(b); 22 C.F.R. § 50.38 (1958).
243. See Ming. v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1955); Note, Establishing Citizenship:
Remedies Available to Persons Outside the United States, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 360, 361 (1955).
Cf. Developments in Law-Immigration and Nationality, 66 Harv L. Rev. 643, 673 (1953).
244. Correia v. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 533, 534 (D.R.I. 1954); Avina v. Brownell, 112 F.
Supp. 15, 17 (S.D. Tex. 1953).
245. Act of 1952 § 360(a). (The act established a five year statute of limitations.)
246. H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1952).
247. Act of 1952 § 360(b).
248. Id. § 360(c). Cf. Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 183 (1957).
249. Id. § 360(b).
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passport is denied "on the ground that the person has not established
his identity.1125°
The claimant's "good faith" "is to be determined by the diplomatic
or consular officer ... in the light of the facts and circumstances of
each case. ' 251 The claim's substantiality must be such that it:
satisfies the diplomatic or consular officer . .. that the claim . .. is .. . suf-
ficiently meritorious to justify a determination of the question by the Attorney Gen-
eral in connection with an application for admission into the United States.252
Denial of a certificate of identity overseas by a diplomatic or consular
officers 3 may be appealed to the Secretary of State.se The law is still
uncertain whether the Secretary can be compelled to issue a certificate.2 55
And it is also an unsettled question whether, despite the limitations in
the Act of 1952, 25 a nonresident alien may test his claim to citizenship
through an action for a declaratory judgment.25
The reason advanced for the change from the 1940 Act to the 1952
was that substantial fraud was being perpetrated against the United
States in passport and immigration matters in Hong Kong.255 The
250. 22 C.F.R. § 50.32 (1958). Applications for certificates of identity are not even
accepted in such instances. Note, Establishing Citizenship: Remedies Available to Persons
Outside the United States, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 360, 370 (1955). But see Yee Mee v. Dulles, 136
F. Supp. 199, 200 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
251. 22 C.F.R. § 50.30 (1958).
252. Id. § 50.31.
253. The officer must make a notation of "the factual and/or legal grounds for the
denial." 22 C.F.R. § 50.37 (1958).
254. Appeal may be had by the alien, through the office which denied the certificate, 22
C.F.R. § 50.38 (1958), or directly to the Secretary (through the Passport Office) by an
attorney in the United States. 22 C.F.R. § 50.39 (1958). If the Secretary sustains the
denial, he must state his reasons in writing. Act of 1952 § 360(b).
255. Few pertinent cases have arisen under the Act of 1952. Avina v. Brownell, 112
F. Supp. 15, 19 (SD. Tex. 1953) says, obiter, that the Secretary can be so directed. The
issue was left open in D'Argento v. Dulles, 113 F. Supp. 933, 937 (DiD.C. 1953). See
Developments in Law-Immigration and Nationality, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 643, 743 (1953). For
rulings under the Nationality Act of 1940, see Dulles v. Lung, 212 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1954) ;
Wong Beck Ling v. Dulles, 119 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1953); Sing v. Dulles, 116 F. Supp. 9
(E.D.N.Y. 1953).
256. See note 248 supra.
257. Holdings allowing action: Yee Mee v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 199 (W.D. Pa. 1955);
Tom Mung Ngow v. Dulles, 122 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C. 1954). Contra, Gonzalez-Gomez v.
Brownell, 114 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. Colo. 1953); Vasquez v. Brownell, 113 F. Supp. 722 (W.D.
Tex. 1953). The Supreme Court specifically left this issue undecided in Brownell v. Tom We
Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 184 (1957). Cf. S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1952).
258. See Ly Shew v. Acheson, 110 F. Supp. 50, 54-57 (1953); Joint Hearings, supra note
97, at 338; Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations,
Department of justice Appropriations for 1957, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 225, 231 (1956);
Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, Department
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major issue was generally one of identity, whether the claimant was the
person he alleged himself to be; largely-but not wholly2 5 9-the persons
involved were of Chinese-American extraction. In order to prevent
"spurious" claims from "clogging up both administrative and judicial
dockets,' 26" a new legislative "formula" was designed and incorporated
into the Act of 1952.
How, and on what theory, this new "formula" is being administered
was described by the American Consul General in Hong Kong, the
area of the major difficulties which brought on the new provision. He
wrote:
The attempt has been made to confine the action of 360(b) to controversial questions
of law. The section is to be utilized, for example, when a provision of law is susceptible
of two or more interpretations and the point of difference has not been clarified by
judicial decisions, or when a case presents new questions of law on which there are no
administrative or judicial guides. One should not, however, exclude the possibility of
isolated cases in which issues of fact may be better resolved at hearing at a port of entry
in the United States than at a Foreign Service office.26
1
It is significant that, in hearings leading to the enactment of the 1952 law,
the State Department made not-dissimilar suggestions for a limitation
of judicial review.26 2
This administrative policy merits close analysis. First, there is the
breath-taking blitheness with which it passes by one of the law's most
perplexing problems, the distinction between law and fact 6 "What one
judge regards as a question of fact another thinks is a question of law. 26 4
Furthermore, the very decision, whether it be a question of fact or of law
is itself a question of law.2 65 Furthermore, as Professor Jaffe has said,
"the adequacy of the evidence adduced to support a finding of fact is a
question of law." '2 66 Congressional awareness of this difficulty may, in
part, explain why the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes a court,
in the process of judicial review of administrative decision, to review
"the whole record.1
267
Second, what justification can there be to empower only one party to
of Justice Appropriations for 1958, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 365-73 (1957) ; Wright Report, supra
note 18, at 480-82.
259. See Joint Hearings, supra note 97, at 590-91.
260. See Report, supra note 209, app. at 91.
261. Letter from Everett F. Drumright, April 18, 1955. Note, Establishing Citizenship:
Remedies Available to Persons Outside the United States, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 360, 370 (1955).
262. See, Joint Hearings, supra note 97, at 210. (The testimony was intended to liberalize
the bills then under consideration.)
263. See Davis, Administrative Law 874 (1951).
264. Att'y Gen., Report of Comm'n on Administrative Procedure 90 (1941).
265. Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 11-12 (1922).
266. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1020 (1956).
267. APA § 10(e).
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a controversy to decide what legal or constitutional issues are still so
"controversial" as to merit review? Whether an issue is "controversial,"
or whether a court may be persuaded to reverse even a long standing
ruling, is frequently the very point at stake. Furthermore, what protec-
tion does a claimant have where there is no new principle of law involved
in his case but where the "old" principles have been incorrectly applied
to him? If the government can control litigation by final decisions as to
when litigants may or may not have a good "legal" case, a grievous blow
will be dealt to the very concept and purpose of judicial review. The
fundamental unsoundness of the present situation is illustrated by the
fact that a citizenship claimant who presents himself for admission at a
land port of entry can obtain a full hearing and can go upon appeal to
the Board of Immigration Appeals26 and to the courts.
Third, the grudging admission of "the possibility" that in "isolated
cases" issues of facts may "be better resolved" in open, adversary hearings
then in one-sided administrative investigations without hearings2 69 repre-
sents astonishing naivete as to what is at the basis of most litigation, a
controversy over facts. It is a monumental disregard of the legal truism
that the facts often determine the law of the case. Justice Holmes spoke
of "the facts that establish the law,"27'1 and Judge Frank said: "A Court's
decision turns on the 'facts' of the case."-7 - On this point, Justice Miller
said:
In my experience in the conference room of the Supreme Court ... I have been sur-
prised to find out how readily those judges come to an agreement upon the questions of
law, and how often they disagree in regards to questions of fact. 73
And Chief Justice Hughes, once also Secretary of State, said in
another context what is relevant here in principle:
An unscrupulous administrator might be tempted to say, 'Let me find the facts for the
people of my country, andI care little who lays down the general principles.' 274
The practice in connection with issuance of certificates of identity
ignores the. crucial fact that the legal rights provided by the statute
depend upon the determination of facts, some of which are stated by the
268. See In re A-, BIA A-10046823 (Dec. 2, i957), where inspector and special inquiry
officer ruled that a naturalized citizen had lost citizenship by virtue of excessive foreign
residence, and where BIA reversed on error of law.
269. Cf. Note, Establishing Citizenship, Remedies Available to Persons Outside the
United States, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 360, 369 (1955).
270. See, Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 Yale L.J, 238 (1950).
271. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 21.1 U.S. 210, 227 (1908).
272. Frank, If Men Were Angels 74, 92 (1942).
273. Frank, op. cit. supra note 272, at 78; Frank, Law and the Modem Mind 106 (1931).
274.' Frank, op. cit. supra note'272, at 77.
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act itself as being decisive of eligibility to the rights2 5 It repudiates the
traditional and time-tested role of judicial and administrative tribunals
as triers of the fact and seems totally oblivious of the status of the jury
system in Anglo-American law. It procedes on the singular assumption
that one side of a controversy should decide the facts27 -as extraordinary
a conclusion as that one side should decide the law. It subjects an Amer-
ican citizen "to the risk of being deprived of his heritage by a possible
error of a minor administrative official without any redress."2 '7 In prac-
tice," 's it empowers an administrative official at a relatively low level to
be the final arbiter of a claim to American citizenship. It makes the
constitutional rights of citizenship "depend upon the arbitrary will" of
a minor official.2
79
The Government's laudable preoccupation with preventing fraud has
blinded it to other overriding values. The Supreme Court put the prob-
lem into perspective:
It is better that many Chinese immigrants should be improperly admitted than that one
natural born citizen of the United States should be permanently excluded from his
country. 28
0
The comments of a former president of the American Bar Association,
made in another connection, are relevant here:
My objection goes to the theory that the end justifies the means of accomplishment,
regardless of fundamental rights or privileges.
28
'
The dangers attendant upon foreclosing judicial scrutiny in such
manner and in placing final authority in the agency which makes the
original decision of denial of a certificate of identity are illustrated
through the results of a survey made by the National Council on Natural-
ization and Citizenship. A review of cases brought under the 1940 Act
and the Declaratory Judgment Act showed that out of a total of 44 cases
"in 35 instances it was held that the petitioner was an American and
therefore that his rights had been improperly denied him. '2 2 The evil
and mischief wrought by illegality of administrative acts 8 3 not brought
275. The Deputy Attorney General urged that a certificate of identity be granted to all
"who have more than a frivolous claim to citizenship." Joint Hearings, supra note 97, at 721.
276. "[flairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts
decisive of rights." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951)
(concurring opinion).
277. Tom Mung Ngow v. Dulles, 122 F. Supp. 709 at 712 (D.D.C. 1954).
278. Dulles, The Effect in Practice of the Report on Administrative Procedure, 41 Colum.
L. Rev. 617 (1941).
279. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 217 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
280. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 464 (1920).
281. Loyd Wright, quoted in Frank, op. cit. supra note 272, at 43.
282. Butler, supra note 97, at 106. See also Pres. Com. Hearings at 1591.




under judicial cognizance is further revealed in testimony of the State
Department. In seeking to justify a budget item for investigating frauds
in Hong Kong, the Department pointed out that in fiscal year 1956, as
a result of the Department's efforts in investigating such frauds, the
Government won 338 (or 82 per cent) of the 412 fraud cases in the
courts, and the alien won 74 (or 18 per cent), and that in the last six
months of 1956, the ratio in the 396 cases in the courts was 379 (or 96
per cent) for the Government and 17 (or 4 per cent) for the alien.284 The
sad fact still remains that 78 citizens would illegally and improperly have
been denied their constitutional rights if administrative absolutism
reigned without judicial review.
The Act of 1952 creates an anomalous situation. Under the We Shung
case, an alien under an exclusion order may test his statutory rights in
declaratory judgment proceedings. 85 But a person who claims American
citizenship has less extensive remedies to test his constitutional rights.
286
The Act of 1952 deprives many American citizens, native-born as well
as naturalized, of the right to obtain judicial protection against improper
or erroneous rejections of their citizenship claims. Limitations on the
opportunity of claimants, whether within or without the United States,
to prove their rights, render the rights of citizenship hollow indeed.2 8'
Thus the present law affords seriously curtailed safeguards to what the
Supreme Court once said is regarded by many "as the highest hope of
civilized men, ' 288 United States citizenship. The claim to American
citizenship, said Dean Van Vleck:
[I]s too important to be left to the routine of administrative action for conclusive and
final action without the protection of judicial review of the justice of the decision on the
evidence in the record.289
The need for a change of the law in this field has been widely recog-
nized. "No American citizen should be deprived of his day in Court to
support his claim against unjustified challenge," said the President's
Commission on Immigration and Naturalization.290 It recommended that
"there should be opportunity for a full Court review on issues of United
States citizenship, even where the citizenship claim is made by a person
seeking entry to the United States."1291 That some claimants have abused
284. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropria-
tions, Department of State Appropriations of 1958, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 365-73 (1957).
(The Department predicted that the ratio of victories would rise for the aliens.)
285. See note 226 supra.
286. See Sutherland, The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 85, 188 (1957).
287. Cf. Note, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 559, 561 (1955).
288. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 120 (1943).
289. Van Vleck, op. cit. supra note 95, at 248.




privileges under the Nationality Act of 1940, said the Commission, "does
not warrant a blanket deprivation of protection to an American citizen
who happens to be outside the United States."
The American Bar Association adopted a resolution to substantially
the same effect:
BE IT RESOLVED, that it is the opinion of the American Bar Association that any
person whether within or without the United States who claims to be a national shall be
entitled to a judicial determination of his claim, and where a court finds that the action
is instituted in good faith and has a substantial basis, he shall be entitled to a certificate of
identity, to enable him to appear in person in such proceedings, and that the Section of
Administrative Law be authorized and directed to advance appropriate legislation to that
end.292
The House Subcommittee responsible for immigration matters favor-
ably reported a bill which would deal even more harshly with claims of
American citizenship, through abolishing the provisions in the Act of
1952 and substituting an even more limited form of review.292  Both
the President's Commission and the American Bar Association would
restore the law, more or less, as it was under the Nationality Act
of 1940.293 Rights so basic as citizenship deserve no less a standard of
protection than full judicial review of all administrative determinations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Seven procedural or administrative areas of our present immigration
and nationality laws have been analyzed and considered in the light of
the following criterion:
The heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for the elementary rights of
men, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic government must therefore practice
fairness .... 294
The recommendations herein made for reform through remedial legis-
lation, or otherwise, will, it is believed, meet the test of the above-stated
criterion and advance and enhance our national welfare and security.
292. See note 57 supra. The American Bar Association's view is adopted in substance in
H.R. 3364, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 455 (1957).
292a. H.R. 13,311, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). See notes 239a, 239b supra, and ac-
companying text.
293. This is also recommended in Developments in Law-Immigration and Nationality,
66 Harv. L. Rev. 643, 745 (1953). Grant of certificates of identity to all claimants out of the
United States is urged in Note, Establishing Citizenship: Remedy Available to Persons Outside
the United States, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 360, 377 (1955). But cf. Zimmerman, Judicial Versus
Administrative Determination of Controverted Claims to United States Citizenship, 43 Geo.
L.J. 19 (1954) (recommends administrative determinations).
294. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (con-
curring opinion).
